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STANDING STILL IN THE ROBERTS
COURT
Jonathan H. Adlert
In 2007, The New York Times reported "limiting the ability of
plaintiffs to bring or appeal lawsuits" had emerged as an early
"theme" of the Roberts Court. 1 The Wall Street Journal concurred,
reporting "the biggest change under Chief Justice Roberts might not
involve who wins on the merits" but "who gets through the
courthouse door in the first place."2 Reviewing some of the Court's
initial decisions, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky commented that "the
effect of many of the Court's decisions was to close the courthouse
doors." 3 More colorfully, Professor Judith Resnick labeled the
October 2006 term-the first full term since the confirmations of
Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito-as
'"the year they closed the courts. "'4
It is admittedly too soon to reach any definitive conclusions about
the Roberts Court. The current Justices have yet to sit together for
four full terms. An early consensus is emerging nonetheless that one
effect of the Roberts Court is to make it more difficult for prospective
plaintiffs to have their day in federal court.

t Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. This paper was prepared for the Case Western
Reserve Law Review symposium on "Access to the Courts in the Roberts Era," January 30,
2009.
1 Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2007, at AI.
2
Jess Bravin, Court Under Roberts Limits Judicial Power; Conservative Shift Sets
Hurdles for Litigants, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2007, at AI.
3 Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 437 (2007);
see also Charles Whitebread, The Conservative Kennedy Court-What a Difference a Single
Justice Can Make: The 2006-2007 Tenn of the United States Supreme Court, 29 WHJITIER L.
REv. 1, 5 (2007) (identifying "the Court's determination to close off access to courts" as a
"theme" of the October 2006 Supreme Court term).
4 Greenhouse, supra note 1 (quoting Professor Judith Resnik, Yale Law School).
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In some areas the Roberts Court does appear to have reduced
access to the courts, as the commentators claim. Through its first
three terms the Court accepted arguments that federal law preempts
state tort litigation almost unerringly. 5 The Court interpreted relevant
statutory provisions and statutes of limitations narrowly to preclude
litigation6 and declined requests to authorize previously undiscovered
causes of action. 7 As Professor Gene Nichol observed, this is a court
that interprets statutory limits on litigation strictly and is reluctant to
recognize new implied rights of action or adopt new, broadened
interpretations of statutory bases for suits against private fmns. 8 Yet
the Court has not uniformly ruled against access to federal courts,
having opened the door to climate change litigation9 and habeas
claims by Guantanamo detainees. 10
Those areas in which the Court has limited citizen access to courts
have something in common: a statutory foundation. Where the Court
has erected or enforced barriers to private litigants seeking access to
federal courts, it has grounded its decisions in the relevant federal
statutes. The decisions in these cases all turn on statutory language
and legislative intent. 11 As a consequence, nearly any of these
decisions could be readily overturned by legislative action-and some
may well be. Among its first actions in 2009, Congress enacted
legislation to overturn the Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. 12 that barred Lilly Ledbetter's pay discrimination
claim. Additional legislation overturning other decisions limiting
private litigation, including the Court's holding that federal law
preempts state law tort claims against medical device manufacturers
in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 13 may follow. 14
5 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 947,968
(2008) ("Every preemption case decided so far by the Roberts Court has been decided in favor
of finding preemption."). But see Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009); Altria Group, Inc. v.
Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619
(2008) (rejecting claim that punitive damages for oil spill were preempted by federal Clean
Water Act).
6 John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008); Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205 (2007); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Actof2009, Pub. L. No. lll-2, 123 Stat. 5.
7 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
s Gene R. Nichol, The Roberts Court and Access to Justice, 59 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
821 (2009).
9 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
10 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
11 The claim here is not that all of these decisions were correctly decided, but rather that
the respective holdings were all justified on statutory grounds.
12 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
13 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
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Congress does not retain the same ability to modify the Court's
holdings in all "access to justice"-type cases. Specifically, Congress
has limited ability to second-guess judicial decisions concerning
Article ill standing. In the standing context, judicial limits on the
ability of private parties to bring suit are often a matter of
constitutional law .15 While Congress retains some ability to alter the
bounds of standing on the margin, this authority is limited because the
Article ill standing requirement is, at its core, a constitutional rule.
Congress may tinker on the edges, but it cannot confer standing on
parties that fail to meet the underlying constitutional requirements in
a given case.
Because standing decisions are more insulated from legislative
revision than other sorts of "access to justice" cases, focusing on the
Roberts Court's approach to standing may allow us to refine our
assessment of the Roberts Court. Specifically, it may illuminate
whether the underlying "theme" of the Court's work in this area is
limiting access to the federal courts, or something else. For example,
if the Court construes statutory jurisdictional provisions quite
narrowly, but does not alter constitutional bases for jurisdiction, the
Court is less "shutting the courthouse door" than it is deferring to
Congress's role as the judiciary's doorman. Insofar as the Court has
not restricted Article ill standing, this suggests that the Court is less
hostile to "access to the ·courts" than it is reluctant to define the
contours of such access itself, leaving to Congress the job of defining
and delimiting citizen rights to sue.
This Arti~le offers a preliminary look at the standing jurisprudence
of the Roberts Court. This is obviously a work in progress, as the
Roberts Court presents an evolving subject of study. At this point,
however, the Roberts Court has yet to tighten the requirements of
Article ill standing. To the contrary, insofar as the Roberts Court has
altered the law of standing, it has made it easier for at least some
litigants to pursue their claims in federal court. The Court's decisions
denying standing have largely reaffirmed prior holdings, warts and
all. By comparison, some of the Court's decisions on standing, most

14 See David Ingram, Democrats Take Aim at Supreme Court Decisions, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
10, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432902339; David Ingram,
Specter Proposes Return to Prior Pleading Standard posting at Blog of the Legal Times, July
23, 2009, http:l/legaltimes. typepad.comlblt/2009/07/specter-proposes-return-to-prior-pleadingstandard.html
15 In some cases, particularly those involving prudential standing, the question of standing
can tum on legislative enactments rather than constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (finding plaintiffs had standing under "zone of interests" prudential
standing doctrine due to congressional authorization of suit by "any person").
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notably Massachusetts v. EPA 16 and, to a lesser extent, Sprint
Communications Co. v. APCC Seryices Inc., 11 have lowered the
standing bar, perhaps quite significantly. Whatever else has transpired
with regard to citizen "access to federal courts" in the first four years
of the Roberts Court, standing for citizens to invoke the jurisdiction
of federal courts remains in place.
I. STANDING IN THE COURT

The constitutional doctrine of standing seeks to determine whether
an individual litigant has a sufficient stake in the outcome of a
particular legal dispute so as to create a "case" or "controversy"
subject to resolution by an Article ill court. As colorfully explained
by then-Judge Antonin Scalia, the standing inquiry asks of the party
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court "What's it to
you?"ls
The specific requirements of Article ill standing, as articulated by
the Supreme Court, are quite familiar to any student of federal courts.
As the Court explained in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 19 and has
repeated many times since, 20 the "irreducible constitutional minimum
of standing" has three parts? 1 First, the "plaintiff must have suffered
an 'injury in fact,"' that is both "actual or imminent" and "concrete
and particularized." 22 Second, there must be a "causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of. ,m Third, there
must be a sufficient likelihood that the "the injury will be 'redressed
by a favorable decision. "' 24 Whether or not these requirements derive
from a proper interpretation of the text of Article ill, the requirement
that a plaintiff have standing in order for there to be a question "of a
Judiciary nature"25 that can be resolved in federal court is cemented
into the foundation of federal constitutional law. While there remains
16 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
n 128 s. Ct. 2S3l (2008).
18 Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983).
19 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
20 See, e.g., NE Fla. Chap. of Associated Gen. Contractors of Amer. v. City of
Jacksonville, Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 663 (1993) (restating the minimum requirements of Article ill
standing articulated in Lujan); U.S. v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742-43 (1995) (same); Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (same); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Envt, 523 U.S. 83,
102-03 (1998) (same); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt1 Svcs, Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
180-81 (2000)(same).
21 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
22 ld.
23 ld.
24 ld. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).
25 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 ,at 430 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (discussion of how judicial power was limited to questions of a "Judiciary nature").
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a vibrant academic debate over the textual and historical provenance
of the contemporary standing doctrine, 26 the basic contours of Article
III standing find near universal assent on the bench.
While there is substantial agreement in the courts over the formal
requirements of Article III standing-injury, causation and
redressability-there is substantial disagreement over how these
requirements should be applied. By most accounts Lujan adopted a
particularly narrow and demanding view of standing's
requirements-a "slash-and-bum expedition through the law of
environmental standing" according to one justice.Z7 Subsequent
decisions, such as Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. 28 and Federal Election
Commission v. Akini 9 adopted more lenient standards, recognizing
less substantial or concrete injuries than Lujan suggested would be
required. As a consequence, the law of standing sees frequent
doctrinal shifts that alter the legal terrain without altering the
underlying fundamentals.
There are several justifications for the standing requirement, such
as the need to ensure sufficient adversity between the parties30 and
vindicate individual rights? 1 The Supreme Court's standing
jurisprudence over the past several decades, however, has grounded
the standing requirement in the separation of powers. As Justice
26 See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?,
102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges,
Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1009 (2002);
James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the Injury-in-Fact Rule,
and the Framers' Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. I
(2001); Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs: The Original
Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 1001 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992); Steven L.
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371
(1988); Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?,
78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The NonHohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968).
27 See, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
2s 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
29 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
3D See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the
Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHl. L.
REV. 545 (2006) (stating Article ill's case or controversy requirement ensures adequate
adversity between the parties). But see Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending-The Role of
Legal and Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 1, 4647 (2001) (arguing ideological plaintiffs
are likely to be sufficiently adverse to satisfy this concern); Scalia, supra note 18.
31 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or
Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARv. L. REv. 297 (1979) (stating among the purposes of
standing the proper representation of individuals and self-determination); see also Eugene
Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REv. 1663, 1664 (2007) (stating standing
"prevent[s] the inefficient disposition of constitutional entitlements" and enables individuals to
determine the best use of their own rights).
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Sandra Day O'Connor stated in Allen v. Wright, 32 "the law of Art. ill
standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of
powers" 33-and this idea helps define the role of judiciary within the
constitutional framework. 34 Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to
declare that "'[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's
proper role in our system of government than the constitutional
limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
controversies. '"35
Whether or not eighteenth and early nineteenth century jurists
recognized an implicit standing requirement in Article ill, the roots of
standing (and other contemporary justiciability doctrines) can be
unearthed in the founding period. "The province of the court is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals," Chief Justice John
Marshall noted in Marbu1y v. Madison. 36 Such cases stand in contrast
to those that are "political" in that "[t]hey respect the nation, not
individual rights" and are entrusted to the elected branches. 37 Where
the rights of individuals are at stake, the judiciary is within its element
and properly exercises the authority of judicial review, even if that
means second-guessing or over-ruling the actions of a coordinate
branch. Yet when individual rights are not at stake, constitutional
questions are properly left to the political branches, each of which has
an independent obligation to uphold and enforce the Constitution.
Notably, this separation of powers justification was explicitly
embraced by two of the current Justices-Chief Justice John Roberts
and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia-before their respective
nominations to the Court. 38 According to then-Judge Scalia, "the
judicial doctrine of standing is a crucial and inseparable element" of
the principle of separation of powers-a principle inherent in the
structure of the Constitution itself. 39 Failure to observe these
principles risks the "overjudicialization of the processes of
self-govemance."40 Then-private attorney John Roberts likewise
observed some years later that the doctrine of standing was "designed
468 U.S. 737 (1984).
ld. at 752.
34 ld. at 750 (explaining how the "case or controversy" requirement "defines with respect
to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is
founded").
35 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)).
36 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
37 ld. at 166.
3 8 See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article Ill Limits on Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1229
(1993); Scalia, supra note 18.
39 Scalia, supra note 18, at 881.
40 ld.
32
33
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to implement the Framers' concept of 'the proper-and properly
limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."'41 As Roberts
then explained, "By properly contenting itself with the decision of
actual cases or controversies at the instance of someone suffering
distinct and palpable injury, the judiciary leaves for the political
branches the generalized grievances that are their responsibility under
the Constitution."42
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Roberts Court generally-and the
Chief Justice in particular-appear to have a "unique interest in
standing cases."43 As documented by Professors Lee Epstein, Andrew
Martin, Kevin Quinn, and J e:ffrey Segal, the percentage of cases
involving standing has been "far higher" than in prior courts.44 Over
four percent of the 145 cases decided by the Roberts Court in its first
two terms involved standing concerns. By comparison, during the
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, the percentage of standing
cases fluctuated between 0.5 and just over 2 percent of the total
cases. 45 This apparent increase in standing cases is perhaps even more
notable as the Roberts Court is hearing significantly fewer cases per
term than its predecessors, particularly the Warren and Burger Courts.
Since joining the Court, Chief Justice Roberts has written an
opinion in all but three cases in which the Court addressed standing
concerns with a signed opinion.46 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the
opinion for the Court finding the plaintiffs had standing in Rumsfeld
v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. 41 and Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co.48 He addressed
the standing of parents to challenge race-conscious school assignment
plans in his plurality opinion in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,49 and wrote the Court's
opinion denying taxpayer standing in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno. 50 This is unlikely to be accidental-the Chief Justice assigns
Roberts, supra note 38, at 1220 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,750 (1984)).
/d. at 1229.
43 Lee Epstein et al., The Bush Imprint on the Supreme Court: Why Conservatives Should
Continue to Yearn and Liberals Should Not Fear, 43 TULsA L. REv. 651, 663 (2008).
44 /d.
45 See id.
46 The three cases were Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008),
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007), and Summers v. Earth
Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009). In a fourth case, Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437
(2007), the Court issued a per curiam opinion.
4'

42

547 u.s. 47 (2006).
128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008).
49 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
so 547 U.S. 332 (2006). In this case, Justice Ginsburg wrote an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment. Id. at 354-55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment).
47
48
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opinion authors so long as he is on the prevailing side of a case. Chief
Justice Roberts also wrote strongly worded dissents from the Court's
conferral of Article ill standing in Massachusetts v. EPA 5 1 and Sprint
Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc. 52 Standing is clearly an
issue close to the Chief Justice's heart.
As already noted, Chief Justice Roberts's interest in standing was
clear before his confmnation to the Court. Though he rarely
expressed public opinions about legal or political issues during his
impressive career as an appellate litigator, he published a short article
in the Duke Law Journal defending the Court's constriction of Article
ill standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 53 Like Justice Scalia
before him, Chief Justice. Roberts suggested that rigorous application
of the "injury-in-fact" requirement keeps the courts within their
appointed roles and safeguards the separation of powers. It is thus
perhaps not surprising that standing has occupied such a large share
of the Roberts Court's early docket-at least in comparison to
previous Courts.
II. STILL STANDING

Whatever the consequences of the Roberts Court's decisions in
other doctrinal areas for citizen "access to the courts," the net effect
of its standing decisions has been to increase access, at least for some
litigants in some sorts of cases. In most respects, however, the
standing doctrine in the first few terms has stood still. Most standing
decisions involve the relatively straightforward application of existing
precedent. In two cases, however, the Court broadened standing to
allow greater access to federal courts, even if only on the margins.
Most of the Roberts Court's standing decisions have been
unanimous, reflecting the uncontroversial-and doctrinally
inconsequential-effects of these decisions. In Lance v. Coffman, 54
for instance, the Court held unanimously, in a brief per curiam
opinion, that four Colorado voters lacked standing to press an
Elections Clause55 challenge to a state constitutional provision
limiting the frequency with which state officials may redraw

549 U.S. 497 (2007).
128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008).
53 See Roberts, supra note 38.
54 549 U.S. 437 (2007).
55 The "Elections Clause" provides that "The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to
the Place of chusing Senators." U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
5t

52
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congressional districts. 56 The voters' suit asserted the sort of
"generalized grievance" long precluded from judicial review. 57 As the
Court explained, the voters' only asserted injury was Colorado's
alleged failure to comply with the Elections Clause, and a claim that a
government failed to follow the law-without more-is insufficient
to satisfy Article Ill. "This injury is precisely the kind of
undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of
government that we have refused to countenance in the past," the
Court explained. 58 As a consequence, the claim was readily
distinguishable from cases in which voters alleged more concrete
harms to their interests, or in which private citizens sued as relators
on behalf of the state. 59
The Court's holding in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno 60 that state
taxpayers lacked Article Ill standing to challenge a state's award of
preferential tax credits to a local manufacturer was only slightly more
consequential. For decades the Court had held that federal taxpayers
lack Article Ill standing to challenge federal spending "simply
because they are taxpayers." 61 As the Court explained in Frothingham
v. Mellon 62 in 1923, a taxpayer's interest in the federal treasury is
indistinct, "minute and indeterminable," and "the effect upon future
taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and
uncertain" as to preclude the justiciability of taxpayer challenges to
federal spending. 63 For the same reason, Chief Justice Roberts
explained, a federal taxpayer would lack standing to challenge a tax
expenditure, such as a tax credit or exemption; "In either case, the
alleged injury is based on the asserted effect of the allegedly illegal
activity on public revenues, to which the taxpayer contributes." 64
In Cuno, the Court held the argument against federal taxpayer
standing to challenge federal appropriations or tax expenditures
"applies with undiminished force to state taxpayers." 65 If state
taxpayers are to challenge preferential tax policies in federal court,
then they must assert some basis for standing beyond their status as
taxpayers, 66 whether they claim the tax provisions at issue violate the
Lance, 549 U.S. at 441-42.
Id. at 439-40 (citing Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922) and Ex parte Levitt, 302
U.S. 633 (1937)).
58 Id. at 442.
59 See id.
60 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
61 Jd. at 343.
62 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
63 Id. at 487.
64 Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344.
65 Id. at 345.
66 Id. at 346.
56

57
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Dormant Commerce Clause or any other structural constitutional
provision. 67 While acknowledging the Court had created a limited
exception for taxpayer standing to challenge legislative Establishment
Clause violations in Flast v. Cohen, 68 Chief Justice Roberts explained
that the injury in such cases is not to the litigant's interest in the
federal Treasury. Rather, "the injury alleged in Establishment Clause
challenges to federal spending" is "the very extract[ion] and
spen[ding] of tax money in aid of religion alleged by the plaintiff. " 69
As a consequence, Flast provided no precedent for challenging
preferential tax credits. Even Justice Ginsburg, who concurred
separately to state her disagreement with some of the more restrictive
standing precedents of the past thirty years, accepted the
"nonjusticiability of Frothingham-type federal and state taxpayer
suits in federal court."70
Yet the Roberts Court is hardly of one mind concerning standing.
Four cases in particular reveal sharp divisions among the Justices on
the application of Article Ill standing's requirements. Massachusetts
v. EPA, 11 Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 12 Hein
v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 13 and Summers v. Earth
Island Institute14 were all 5-4 decisions. In two of these cases,
Massachusetts and Sprint, the Court found Article Ill standing; in the
other two it did not. The breakdown among the Justices remained
consistent across these cases, with the Court's four most liberal
Justices consistently voting to approve standing claims and the four
most conservative Justices consistently in opposition. Only Justice
Anthony Kennedy was in the Court's majority in all four cases,
sometimes writing separately to qualify his position. 75 Here, as in
other areas, Justice Kennedy is the median Justice whose views
determine the outcome in close cases. 76
See id. at 348.
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
69 Cuno, 54 7 U.S. at 348 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 Id. at 355 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
71 549 u.s. 497 (2007).
n 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008).
73 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
74 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
75 This demonstrates the frequency with which Justice Kennedy has cast the deciding vote
in Article III standing cases.
7 6 See Lee Epstein & Tanya Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REv. 37, 67 (2008)
(describing Justice Kennedy as a "super median" justice). Justice Kennedy's ability to determine
case outcomes has led some to call the Roberts Court the "Kennedy Court." See Chemerinsky,
supra note 5, at 953-55 (describing Justice Kennedy's powerful influence as a member of the
majority in 5-4 and 5-3 decisions since 2006); cf Jonathan H. Adler, Getting the Roberts Court
Right: A Response to Chemerinsky, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 983, 1008-11 (2008) (stating that the
idea of a "Kennedy Court" is not a new concept).
67

6s
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The most consequential standing case of the Roberts Court thus far
is Massachusetts v. EPA. 71 Indeed, Massachusetts is among the most
consequential cases decided by the Roberts Court on any issue.
Massachusetts loosened the requirements for Article III standing to
challenge federal regulatory actions, both fm state litigants and others
seeking to allege agency failure to comply with relevant statutory
requirements. More than any other, this case altered preexisting
standing doctrine, and did so in favor of those seeking to invoke the
jurisdiction of federal courts.
At issue in Massachusetts were whether the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") had the authority to regulate carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases as "pollutants" under the Clean
Air Act and, if so, whether the EPA had properly declined to exercise
such authority in rejecting a rulemaking petition submitted by several
states and environmentalist groups. Massachusetts and the other
petitioners sought to force the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles under Section 202 of the Act so
as to mitigate the threat of global_.warrning. Yet before it could
approve the petitioners' claims, the Court had to first assure itself that
at least one had Article III standing.
Climate change presents an interesting standing challenge. The
Court has long held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear
"generalized grievance[s]" that are "'common to all members of the
public. "'78 Thus, an Article III court lacks the jurisdiction to hear a
naked claim that a government agency has failed to violate some
provision of the law or, as noted above, that some portion of the
federal Treasury was appropriated for an illegal purpose. Invoking the
power of federal courts requires something more. In particular, it
requires something that connects the allegedly wrongful act to a
distinct harm suffered by the litigant.
At first blush, the general bar on hearing "generalized grievances"
would seem to preclude hearing a claim predicated on an injury
derived from a gradual warming of the Earth's atmosphere. By
definition, global climate change is a global phenomenon. The
emission of greenhouse gases from motor vehicles in the United
States or anywhere else contributes to global atmospheric
77 549 U.S. 497 (2007). See also Jonathan H. Adler, Wanning Up to Climate Change
Litigation, 93 VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 63 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/
inbrief/2007/05/21/adler.pdf; Jonathan H. Adler, Massachusetts v. EPA Heats Up Climate
Policy No Less Than Administrative Law: A Comment on Professors Watts and Wildennuth,
102 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 32 (2007), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/
lawreview/Colloquy/2007/20/LRColl2007n20Adler.pdf.
78 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974) (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302
U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam)).
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concentrations of greenhouse gases that, in tum, have an effect on the
global climate. The alleged harms from any resulting global warming
would be visited upon the globe, a conclusion that would seem to
preclude the existence of a "case or controversy" fit for judicial
resolution under Article ID. 79 Much like an individual taxpayer could
not claim a judicially cognizable injury from the misuse of funds in
the federal Treasury, an individual citizen of the planet could not
claim a judicially cognizable injury from a slight alteration of the
planetary thermostat. At the very least, a prospective plaintiff would
have to identify an actual or imminent harm to a specific legallyprotected interest resulting from such changes. Such attribution is
very difficult. This is not to deny or disparage the potential
consequences from climate change, but only to recognize the
difficulty of finding a distinct, particularized .injury resulting from
global environmental phenomena.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought to establish the
requisite injury by focusing the Court's attention on a specific
potential consequence of global warming: sea-level rise. 80
Massachusetts submitted affidavits asserting that anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases, by contributing to global warming,
increase the threat of global sea-level rise that would flood some
portion of Massachusetts's coast. 81 These affidavits noted that a
modest rise in sea-level had occurred over the course of the twentieth
century-albeit some of which was due to natural causes-and
estimated the future sea-level rise that could result if anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases continue unabated. 82
The focus on sea-level rise simplified the Court's inquiry, but it
did not make the standing concern go away. An "injury-in-fact" must
be both actual or imminent and concrete and particularized. 83 Therein
lied a potential rub. Demonstrating that the injury from climate
change satisfied one prong of this standard would necessarily make it
more difficult to satisfy the other. Insofar as anthropogenic emissions
of greenhouse gases have already warmed the atmosphere, it is
exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to identify specific
environmental changes that have occurred as a result of the human
contribution to climatic warming with any degree of certainty.
Identifying specific harms that will (or are at least quite likely to)
79
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 541 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ('The very concept of
global warming seems inconsistent with [the] particularization requirement.").
80 !d. at 522.
81 !d. at 521-22 (summarizing affidavits).
82 !d..
83 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
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occur in specific places requires a resort to computer models that seek
to project likely impacts from the human contribution to global
warming in the decades ahead. So the injury is made concrete and
particularized at the expense of its imminence. Again, this is not to
deny the existence of anthropogenic global warming, but only to
recognize that climate scientists have not yet been able to
attribute specific environmental phenomena in specific places to
human contributions to global warming, and this complicates efforts
to demonstrate Article ill standing.
In order to show that its injury was concrete and particularized,
Massachusetts focused on sea-level rise, as the loss of state sovereign
territory would certainly be a tangible harm of the sort Article ill
demands. Yet as already suggested, the problem for Massachusetts
was that in order to identify a specific loss of its own land from
human-induced global warming with any particularity, it was forced
to rely upon model projections far into the future. Specifically,
Massachusetts focused on the potential loss of coastline due to
sea-level rise "by 2100." 84 Focusing on this sort of future injury
enabled Massachusetts to identify a specific harm particular to it, but
at the expense of its ability to claim any such harm was occurring
here and now, and was thus "actual or imminent" as the Court's
interpretation of Article ill requires. Under the pre-existing case law,
assertion of a future injury would not suffice. Yet had Massachusetts
focused on the effects of greenhouse gas emissions already underway,
it would have been forced to assert injury from a modest change in
global atmospheric temperature, and little else. 85 Doing so would
have meant abandoning any claim that the injury Massachusetts
suffered was concrete and particular to its interests as a state.
While purporting to adhere to the traditional test for standing
articulated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 86 the Court took two
steps to ease Massachusetts's legal burden, each of which constitutes
a potentially significant change in the law of standing. 87 First, and
most conspicuously, the Court declared that it was "of considerable
84 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523 n.20 (discussing "possible" effects of rising sea
levels over the next century).
85 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the best estimate
for sea-level rise attributable to the human contribution to global warming is 3.5-Scm over the
entire twentieth century. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 665 (J.T. Houghton et a!. eds., 2001), available at
http://www .grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/?src=/climate/ipcc_tar/wg 1/426.htm#fig 1110.
86 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
87 It is certainly possible that the Court could have found that Massachusetts had standing
within the traditional confines of the injury-in-fact requirement, perhaps by relying on the sheer
enormity of the threat posed by global climate change, but this is not the course that the Court
opted to take.
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relevance" that the petitioner was "a sovereign State and not, as it was
in Lujan, a private individual." 88 This was relevant because "[s]tates
are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal
jurisdiction."89 Having ceded a portion of their sovereign authority to
the federal government, the Court announced, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and other states were entitled to "special solicitude"
when seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of federal courts. 90 With this
newfound solicitude "in mind," the Court had little difficulty
concluding that a miniscule increase in sea-level rise satisfied the
injury-in-fact requirement. 91
The majority purported to justify its newfound "special solicitude"
92
for states in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., a century-old case_ in
which the state of Georgia brought a federal common law nuisance
suit against a polluting factory from across the border in Tennessee. 93
This case had nothing to do with standing, however. Rather, it was a
suit under the federal common law of interstate nuisance-a suit of
the sort that would almost certainly be preempted today under the
Clean Air Act. 94 The only "special solicitude" shown to Georgia in
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518.
Id. at 518.
9o Id. at 520.
9 ' The majority grounded Massachusetts's injury in the claim that "global sea levels rose
somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of global warming."
Id. at522.
The "unchallenged" affidavit the opinion cites for this proposition is more circumspect,
however, claiming only that anthropogenic warming caused "major" contributions to this
observed sea-level rise. See MacCracken Dec!. '![5(c), J. App. at 225, Massachusetts, 549 U.S.
497 (No. 05-1120).
The IPCC, which purports to represent the scientific consensus on global climate change,
attributes a minority of observed sea-level rise to human activities and has largely refrained
from attributing specific amounts of sea-level rise in specific places to anthropogenic climate
forcing. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 85, at 665;
see also Posting of Roger Pielke, Jr. to Prometheus Blog, A Few Comments on
Massachusetts v. EPA, http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archi ves/c limate_change/
001160a_few_comments_on_ep.htrnl (Apr. 2, 2007).
In any event, the amount of sea-level rise that constitutes Massachusetts's actual, present
injury is less than O.lcm-0.2cm per year, and the amount of projected sea-level rise that could
be redressed by regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under Section
202 is even less, as U.S. motor vehicles only represent a fraction of GHG emissions.
92 206 u.s. 230 (1907).
93 Id. at 236.
94 See City of Milwaukee v. illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1981) (holding that the Clean
Water Act preempts interstate nuisance claims for water pollution under federal common law);
see also Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law
of Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REv. 717,768 n.476 (2004) ("Although the Supreme Court
has not directly addressed the question of whether the federal Clean Air Act preempts federal
common law in disputes over transboundary air pollution, it is widely assumed to do so,
particularly in light of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which created a comprehensive
federal permit scheme similar to that established by the Clean Water Act."). But see Connecticut
v. Arner. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309 (2nd Cir. 2009) (rejecting claim that Clean Air Act
88

89
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the case was the Court's willingness to consider providing Georgia
with equitable relief of the sort unavailable to private parties under
federal common law due to the state's "quasi-sovereign" interest in its
territory. 95 Yet it is one thing to hold that one state cannot foul the air
of its neighbor and that state parties can pursue extraordinary
equitable relief in federal court. It is quite another to maintain that a
state's ability to vindicate such a claim on behalf of its citizens gives
rise to a "special solicitude" when a state sues in federal court to
invoke the regulatory apparatus of administrative agencies.
On any fair reading, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper provides little,
if any, support to the majority's newfound doctrine of "special
solicitude." This may explain why the case was not cited in
Massachusetts's briefs. Indeed, the case was not cited in any brief
filed by any party or amicus in the case. 96 While one brief filed by
state amici did argue that states have special interests that should be
taken into consideration as part of the standing analysis, it focused on
the potential for federal law to preempt state regulatory initiatives. 97

preempts suit alleging greenhouse gases contribute to public nuisance of global wamring).
95 Georgia, 206 U.S. at 237.
9 6 The first appearance of the case came during oral argument, when it was raised by
Justice Kennedy:
ruSTICE KENNEDY: What's your authority for that? I have the same
question as the Chief Justice. I was looking at your brief for the strongest case.
Suppose there were a big landowner that owned lots of coastline. Would be have the
same standing that you do or do you have some special standing as a State, and if so
what is the case which would demonstrate that?
MR. Mll..KEY: Well, Your Honor, first of all, we agree that a large
landowner would himself or herself havemsTICE SCALIA: Or even a small landowner?
ruSTICE KENNEDY: No, no. I'm asking whether or not you have some
specialMR. Mll..KEY: YesJUSTICE KENNEDY:-standing as a State and, if so, what the authority for
that is?
MR. Mll..KEY: Your Honor, first of all, I do think we have special standing.
For example, here it's uncontested that greenhouse gases are going to make ozone
problems worse, which makes it harder for us to comply with our existing Clean Air
Act responsibilities.
And the-in the West Virginia case, which is a D.C. Circuit case, the Court
found that that itself provided an independent source of standing. In terms of
Supreme Court cases, the-it's been-for 200 years, this Court has recognized loss
of State sovereign property as a traditionalruSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I don't know. 1907 was Georgia versus
Tennessee Copper, and that was pre-Massachusetts versus Mellon. That seems to me
your best case.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-15, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-ll20).
97 See Brief of the States of Arizona et a!. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1525, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1l20), 2006 WL 2563380. For a critique of these
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Even those who believe states should receive such consideration
recognize the Court's reasoning on this point was quite confused. 98
Recognizing a "special solicitude" for sovereign states was the
Massachusetts Court's first revision to the law of standing. Its
expansion of what constitutes a "procedural right" that would justify
relaxing the traditional standing requirements of causation and
redressability was the second. According to the Court, it was "of
critical importance" that Congress had "authorized this type of
challenge to EPA action. " 99 As the Court had noted in Lujan, the
"normal standards for redressability and immediacy" are relaxed
when a statute vests a litigant with "procedural rights." 100 This is
because, as Justice Kennedy explained in Lujan, "'Congress has the
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before. "' 101
However, as the Massachusetts Court noted (again citing Justice
Kennedy's Lujan concmrence), "'In exercising this power . . .
Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate
and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit. "' 102
Therefore, the Court could relax the "normal standards for
redressability and immediacy" so long as Congress identified the
injury it sought to vindicate and the related the injury to those entitled
to bring suit. Yet Congress never did anything of the kind.
The only congressional enactment cited by the Court as a
justification for easing standing's traditional redressability and
immediacy requirements was Section 307(b)(l) of the Clean Air Act.
Here, according to the Court, is where Congress had "authorized this
type of challenge to EPA action." This was an innovative reading of
the Clean Air Act. Up until Massachusetts, Section 307(b)(l) had
been recognized as little more than a jurisdictional provision,
identifying which petitions for review of EPA action under the Clean
Air Act must be filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.

alternative arguments for state standing, see Brief of the Cato Institute and Law Professors
Jonathan H. Adler, James L. Huffman, and Andrew P. Morriss as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 14-17, Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497 (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3043962.
98 See
Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPABreaking New Ground on Issues Other Than Global Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY I, 8 (2007), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/17
ILRColl2007nl7Watts.pdf (noting "confusion" about the nature of Massachusetts's sovereign
interest in the case).
99 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)).
1°0 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,572 n.7 (1992).
101 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
102 ld. at 516 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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Circuit as opposed to regional circuit courts of appeals. 103 By its
terms, this provision does not create a new procedural right, let alone
"identify" an injury and "relate the injury to the class of persons
entitled to bring suit." 104 The underlying right to review agency action
is found in the Administrative Procedure Act, not Section 307 of the
Clean Air Act. 105 Indeed, the Clean Air Act contains a citizen suit
provision of its own that is virtually identical in every meaningful
respect to the Endangered Species Act .provision found not to create
such a right in Lujan. 106
In Lujan, the Court held that the Endangered Species Act's
conferral of the right of "'any person ... to enjoin"' any federal
agency "'alleged to be in violation"' of the Act was insufficient to
create a procedural right, the violation of which would satisfy the
requirements of standing. 107 Such a provision, Justice Kennedy
explained, "does not of its own force establish that there is an injury
in 'any person' by virtue of any 'violation."' 108 Yet if this is so, it is
hard to conceive how a jurisdictional provision such as Section 307,
which by its own terms does not impose any obligations on the EPA
nor confer any express rights, does anything more to establish the
existence of a judicially-cognizable injury. If the Court is to be taken
at its word, Massachusetts effects a remarkable shift in administrative
law by greatly expanding the class of statutes that should now be
recognized as the source of procedural rights that justify loosening the
causation and redressability requirements for standing. 109
Having found a justification for loosening the causation and
redressability requirements, the Court had little problem concluding
that these requirements had been met. While citing the longstanding
rule that a favorable decision must "'relieve a discrete injury"' to the
103 See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(l) (2000) (providing, in pertinent part, that "[a] petition for
review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national primary or secondary
ambient air quality standard ... or any other nationally applicable regulations promulgated, or
final action taken, by the Administrator under this chapter may be filed only in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.").
104 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 516 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)); see Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA- The Inconvenient Truth About
Precedent, 93 VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 75, 79-80 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/
inbrief/2007/05/21/cass.pdf.
105 See Cass, supra note 104, at 80.
106 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000). This provision was not at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA.
107 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting 16 U.S.C. §
1540(g)(l)(A)) (ellipsis in original).
10Bid. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(l)(A)).
109 It is also possible that this portion of the Court's holding will be abandoned in
subsequent cases. The Supreme Court is often criticized for its erratic application of
administrative law principles. See generally Robert A Anthony, The Supreme Court and the
APA: Sometimes They Just Don't Get It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1 (1996).
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plaintiff, the majority held that any government action that, all else
equal, reduces (or at least retards the growth of) global emissions of
greenhouse gases by any amount will suffice to redress some portion
of the warming-induced injury. 110 After all, Justice John Paul Stevens
explained, "A reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace
of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere." 111
And this, in turn, would have some effect on future projections of
sea-level rise-even if only by less than one inch between now and
2100. Under this loosened standard, any contribution of any size to a
cognizable injury would be sufficient for causation, and any step, no
matter how small, is sufficient to provide the necessary redress.
The Massachusetts majority's expansive approach to standing
prompted a strongly worded dissent from Chief Justice Roberts. 112
While accepting that "[g]lobal warming may be a 'crisis,' even 'the
most pressing environmental problem of our time,'" 113 the Chief
Justice concluded that such global environmental concerns were not
amenable to resolution in federal courts. The Chief Justice
accused the majority of abandoning ')udicial self-restraint" and
adopting an "utterly manipulable" approach to the Article ill standing
requirements in its effort to prop open the courthouse doors for
climate change plaintiffs. 114 Massachusetts, in his view, resurrected
the "high-water mark of diluted standing requirements, United States
v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP)," a
case that stretched the bounds of Article ill. 115 Massachusetts,
Roberts intoned "is SCRAP for a new generation." 116
The Court may appear to have taken a slight step back from
Massachusetts' permissive approach to standing in Summers v. Earth
Island Institute, 117 decided shortly after this Symposium was held.
Here, a 5-4 Court rejected environmentalist groups' efforts to
challenge revised procedures the U.S. Forest Service adopted to
110 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,525 (2007) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 244 n.l5 (1982)) (emphasis added).
11
' Id. at 526.
2
'' See id. at 535-49 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
113 I d. at 535 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22, 26, Massachusetts, 549 U.S.
497 (No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 558353).
114
Id. at 548. This "effort" appears to have been successful insofar as federal appellate
courts have found private plaintiffs to have had standing in subsequent climate change cases.
See Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309 (2nd Cir. 2009) (state and
private plaintiffs have standing for alleged harms from climate change); Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (same), reh'g en bane granted, 2010 WL 685796 (5th Cir.
Feb. 26, 2010). But see Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D.Cal. 2009)
(rejecting standing).
115 Id. at 547.
116 Id. at 548.
117 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
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streamline timber removal on small parcels affected by forest frres. 118
Specifically, the Court held that environmentalist plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge revisions to U.S. Forest Service regulations
governing relatively small frre-rehabilitation and timber-salvage
projects absent an injury tied to the application of these rules to a
specific project. While this was an unwelcome decision for
environmentalist groups, it was neither much of a surprise nor a
significant change in the law of standing.
Summers arose when several environmentalist groups filed suit
against the U.S. Forest Service for failing to provide adequate notice
and comment for a timber salvage sale, the Burnt Ridge project,
covering 238 acres of fire-damaged timber in the Sequioa National
119
Forest. According to the Forest Service, salvage projects of this sort
were exempt from the otherwise applicable statutory notice and
120
comment requirements. The environmentalist groups countered that
this exclusion was illegal, and sought a nationwide injunction to
prevent the Forest Service from exempting any such projects from its
procedural rules.
The environmentalist groups unquestionably had standing to file
their initial suit. They were challenging the Forest Service's actions
with regard to a specific project at a location frequently used by at
least one of their members. 121 Yet standing to challenge federal
agency rules as applied to a specific project does not confer standing
to challenge the same agency's rules in the abstract-and that is
where the plaintiffs' problems emerged.
The environmentalist plaintiffs quickly prevailed in their initial
suit. They obtained a district court injunction against the Burnt Ridge
project, prompting the federal government to settle the case. 122 At this
point, according to the District Court, the Burnt Ridge project was no
longer an issue in the case, 123 and yet the environmentalist groups
sought to press their claims against the Forest Service's policy of
excluding small timber salvage projects from the otherwise applicable
procedural rules.

IIBJd. at 1147,115).
119 Id.

at 1147-48.
Id. at 1147; see also 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a), 215.12(f) (providing that procedural
requirements would not apply to forest projects categorically excluded from requirement of
producing either an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment under the
National Environmental Policy Act).
2
1 1 Id. at 1149 (describing affidavits).
122
See Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F.Supp.2d 994 (E.D.Cal. 2005); Summers, 129 S.
Ct. at 1148.
123
Earth Island lnst., 376 F.Supp.2d at 999.
120

1080

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:4

Writing for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia explained that the
plaintiffs no longer had standing to challenge the Forest Service's
policy once they had settled their claims concerning the application of
the policy to the Burnt Ridge project. This was the only specific
project the plaintiffs had ever identified for which the application of
the Forest Service policy would cause them a judicially cognizable
injury. 124 Without the prospect of an injury resulting from the Burnt
Ridge sale, plaintiffs could no longer claim standing to challenge "the
regulation in the abstract," as they could no longer identify "any
concrete application that threatens imminent harm to [their]
interests." 125 Although Congress sought to provide prospective
plaintiffs with a procedural right to file comments on proposed
projects, plaintiffs did not have standing to vindicate such rights
because they were unable to identify "some concrete interest that is
affected by the deprivation." 126
Writing in dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer did not challenge the
majority's application of the traditional standing requirements so
much as he sought to explain why a more permissive test should
apply. So, for example, Justice Breyer "concede[d] that the Court
sometimes used the word 'imminent"' when enumerating the
constitutional requirements of Article ill standing, but argued that this
should be understood only to preclude standing for '"conjectural' or
'hypothetical' or otherwise speculative" harms. 127 If any alleged harm
would occur at some unidentified future date, in an undetermined
location, Justice Breyer argued, there should still be standing where
there is a "realistic likelihoocf' that the plaintiff would suffer harm
from the government's future conduct. 128 Under this rule, the
plaintiffs would have standing as there was a "realistic likelihood"
that one or more members of the plaintiff environmentalist
organizations would suffer an injury from the future application of the
Forest Service policy to various salvage projects throughout the
national forests. As Justice Breyer explained, "a threat of future harm

124 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1150 (noting plaintiffs' "failure to allege that any particular
timber sale or other project claimed to be unlawfully subject to the regulations will impede a
specific and concrete plan ... to enjoy the National Forests").
The plaintiffs did submit additional affidavits filed after the district court's decision. The
Court did not consider whether these "late-filed" affidavits alleged facts sufficient to support
standing as there was no rule or precedent to support the consideration of such material "after
the trial is over, judgment has been entered, and a notice of appeal has been filed." Id. at 1153
(emphasis omitted); see also id. at 1150 n. *.
125 Summers, 129 S.Ct. at 1150.
126 Id. at 1151.
127 Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128 ld. at 1155-56.
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may be realistic even where the plaintiff cannot specify precise times,
dates, and GPS coordinates." 129
Whatever the merits of Justice Breyer's preferred approach, it
departs significantly from the standing for injury-in-fact articulated in
Lujan and reiterated in cases since. The plaintiffs in Lujan were also
environmentalist organizations with many members with an
undisputed interest in the preservation of endangered species. As a
consequence, there was a "reasonable likelihood" that one or more
members of the plaintiff groups would have suffered a harm from the
challenged policy in the future, insofar as it would have allowed the
federal government to fund projects that could destroy endangered
species habitat overseas. Yet the Lujan court required more. Harms
that would occur "someday" in the future were not enough, however
reasonably likely they might have been. In other words, under Lujan,
plaintiffs were required to identify a time, date, or GPS coordinate
where the harm would occur. To grant plaintiffs standing in Summers
would have been to loosen the strictures adopted in Lujan.
The Court narrowly rejected the standing of another interest group
plaintiff in Rein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. 130
The Freedom from Religion Foundation ("FRF") alleged the
Bush Administration's Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause by
hosting conferences at which speakers used excessively religious
imagery and suggested that faith-based programs might be more
effective at delivering social services than secular entities because of
their religious orientation. 131
Substantively, FRF's claim was always a bit of a stretch under
existing precedent132 The standing claim was not much stronger. As
already noted, taxpayer standing is generally disfavored. A plaintiff's
status as a taxpayer, without more, is ari insufficient basis for Article
III standing. As the Court noted in Rein, "if every federal taxpayer
could sue to challenge .any Government expenditure, the federal
courts would cease to function as courts of law and would be cast in
the role of general complaint bureaus." 133
FRF sought to avoid this general bar to taxpayer standing by
relying upon Flast v. Cohen. 134 In Flast, the Supreme Court
129 /d.

at 1156.
127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007).
131 /d. at 2559.
1
32 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REv. 115,
116 (stating that case was a "lawsuit destined to go nowhere").
133 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559.
134 392 U.S. 83 (1968); see Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2565.
13o

1082

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:4

recognized a narrow exception to the general rule against taxpayer
standing for a subset of Establishment Clause cases. 135 Specifically,
the Court allowed a taxpayer to challenge federal grants to religious
schools under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
because "the Establishment Clause ... specifically limit[s] the taxing
and spending power" under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. 136
The problem for FRF was that the Court had long construed the
Flast exception in a stingy fashion. Flast was an anomaly in the
jurisprudence of taxpayer standing that had "already been limited
strictly to its facts" by 1983. 137 In nearly all of the Court's subsequent
cases, the Court read Flast quite narrowly. 138 Unless a specific case
rested on all fours with Flast, the Court was almost certain to reject
taxpayer standing. 139 In order to demonstrate standing, taxpayers were
required to establish a nexus between their status as taxpayers and the
specific use of the Article I, Section 8 spending power through a
specific legislative enactment. 140 As the Court explained in Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 141 Flast "limited taxpayer standing to
challenges directed 'only [at] exercises of congressional power"'
under the taxing and spending power. 142 Thus, the Court found
taxpayer standing in Tilton v. Richardson 143 and Bowen v.
Kendrick, 144 but not in other post-Flast cases.
This distinction between legislative and executive acts proved fatal
to FRF' s claims. Because Congress never enacted legislation
explicitly funding or approving the Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiative actions FRF sought to challenge, FRF could not
avail itself of the Flast exception for._ taxpayer standing. In his opinion
for the Court, Justice Alita repeatedly stressed that Flast had only
concerned challenges of legislatively-authorized spending, and
135 Flast, 392 U.S. at 105-06.
136fd. at 105.
137 See Scalia, supra note 18, at 898. It is also worth noting that Flast was perhaps the last
case to explicitly reject a separation-of-powers rationale for standing. See id. at 897 (citing
Flast, 392 U.S. at 100-01).
I3B See Lee Epstein eta!., supra note 43, at 664 (explaining that the Burger, Rehnquist, and
Roberts Courts have all narrowly construed Flast); see also Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling
Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612,628 (2004) ("In the years following Flast, the Court embarked

on a process of limiting the federal taxpayer standing doctrine.").
139 Staudt, supra note 138, at 628-29 (discussing various decisions that narrowly construed
Flast); see also Epstein eta!., supra note 43, at 664 ("Unless the dispute was a near-carbon copy
of Flast, they almost never granted standing.").
140 See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 620 (1988).
141454 U.S. 464 (1982).
142 /d. at 479 (alteration in original) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968)).
143 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
144 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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declined FRF' s invitation to expand taxpayer standing for
Establishment Clause challenges to discrete Executive Branch
actions. Doing so, Justice Alita warned, would have authorized undue
judicial intrusion into the workings of the Executive Branch. 145
Commentators were quite critical of Hein. Some alleged the Court
"overturned years of precedent" with its decision. 146 Anthony Lewis
charged the Court "covertly overruled earlier decisions . . .
recognizing the standing of members of the public to challenge
measures that assist religious activities." 147 Yet what is actually
striking about Hein is how little it changed. Not only did the decision
not overturn "years of precedent," it left standing the law of taxpayer
standing in the Establishment Clause context, neither expanding nor
contracting the Flast exception.
This is not a defense of Hein. 148 The legislative-executive
distinction is not particularly satisfying. Indeed, six of the nine
Justices joined opinions explicitly rejecting it. The four dissenters
were happy with Flast, if only it could be expanded. They preferred
to allow taxpayer challenges to alleged establishments of religion,
whether by legislative or executive act. 149 Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, concurred separately to call for overruling Flast
entirely
and eliminating all taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause
150
cases. What these six justices had in common was a belief that the
Flast-Hein distinction between legislative and other governmental
acts is unprincipled and unsustainable.
While Justice Alita's opinion for the Court sought to closely track
the contours of Flast as interpreted and applied in subsequent cases, it
stopped short of defending the actual decision or its initial rationale.
To the contrary, the Alita opinion criticized Flast for giving too little
attention to separation of powers concems. 151 Of those Justices in the
majority, only one-Justice Kennedy-was willing to say Flast was

5

14 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found. Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2569-70 (2007). Justice
Kennedy adopts this same argument in his concurrence. Id. at 2573 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146 See Stephanie Mencimer, Supreme Court: Taking Care of Business, MOTHER
JONES, Jan. 25, 2008, http://www.motheijones.com/politics/2008/0l/supreme-court-taking-carebusiness.
147 Anthony Lewis, The Court: How 'So Few Have So Quickly Changed So Much,' 1HE
N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Dec. 20, 2007, .1!!; 58, 59.
148 For a brief argument that the separation of powers concerns identified by Justice
Kennedy provide a stronger argument for standing in Hein than in Massachusetts, see Jonathan
H. Adler, God, Gaia, the Taxpayer, and the Lorax: Standing, Justiciability, and Separation of
Powers after Massachusetts and Hein, 20 REGENT U. L. REv. 175 (2008).
149 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584-86 (Souter, J., dissenting).
150 See id. at 2573-74 (Scalia, J., concurring).
151 Id. at 2569 (plurality opinion).
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"correct" and should be neither "called into question" nor expanded
to cover additional circumstances .152
However unsatisfying Hein's resolution of the underlying standing
claim may be, it did not constrict taxpayer standing. To the contrary,
He in explicitly left the law of taxpayer standing where it stood before
the case was heard. However stingy the Court's interpretation of Flast
was in Hein, this was not the first case to confine Flast to legislative
exercises of the taxing and spending power, and, if the Court's
composition remains stable (and Justice Kennedy does not change his
mind), it may not be the last.
If He in narrowly denied FRF' s standing, leaving the law of
taxpayer standing in Establishment Clause cases in place, Sprint
Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc. resolved an even more
narrow question of first impression in favor of the party asserting
standing. 153 Sprint Communications arose out of disputes between
payphone operators and long-distance carriers over compensation that
the latter owes the former for "dial-around" calls. 154 Under the federal
Communications Act, long-distance carriers are obligated to
compensate payphone operators for such calls. 155 If the compensation
is not paid, payphone operators may sue long-distance carriers for the
money owed. 156 Because litigation is expensive, payphone operators
may assign their claims to "aggregators" who pursue the claims on
their behalf, economizing on litigation costs by pursuing multiple
claims simultaneously. In Sprint Communications, the question
before the Court was whether an aggregator, APCC Services, could
have standing to pursue dial-around call compensation claims even if
the aggregator retained no financial interest in the litigation. 157
The Court held 5-4 that an aggregator' s lack of a direct stake in
the outcome of the litigation did not preclude standing. 158 Justice
Stephen Breyer explained for the majority that "history and precedent
make clear that such an assignee has long been permitted to bring
suit," even if no prior case had so held. 159 Just because the
aggregators file suit in their own name, and retain no stake in the
at 2572 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
128 S. Ct. 2531, 2533 (2008).
"Dial-around" calls occur when a customer uses an access code or toll-free number to
directly access the long-distance communications carrier to bypass the payphone operator when
making a long-distance call from a payphone. !d. at 2534.
155 See 47 U.S.C. § 226 (2000); 47 C.P.R. § 64.1300 (2008).
156 See Global Crossing Telecornrn., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecornrn., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1513,
1516 (2007).
157 Sprint Commc'ns, 128 S. Ct. at 2533.
15>Jd.

153
154

158Jd.
159Jd.
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outcome of the litigation, 160 the majority saw no reason to strictly
enforce the traditional bar against asserting a third-party's claims,
particularly given the long-standing history of recognizing suits by
assignees in other contexts, such as in qui tam litigation. 161 The
majority further rejected the idea that firms had to use other means of
aggregating claims-such as class actions-if the aggregation of
assignments, as done by APCC Services, would be more efficient at
resolving the payphone operators' claims. 162
The dissent, on the other hand, could find no case in which
equivalent claims had been allowed to proceed, and saw no reason to
open the courthouse door any further, even if only by an inch. Both
history and common sense confirmed "[t]here is a legal difference
between something and nothing," Chief Justice Roberts wrote in
dissent. So long as the aggregators "have nothing to gain from their
lawsuit," he continued, they lack standing to invoke the jurisdiction of
federal courts. 163 Allowing relators or others to pursue claims in
which they retain an interest, or for which they could receive a
bounty, is one thing. Pursuit of a naked claim is something else. As
Chief Justice Roberts explained, "An assignee who has acquired the
bare legal right to prosecute a claim but no right to the substantive
recovery cannot show that he has a personal stake in the litigation." 164
The dueling opinions devoted extensive space-nearly fifty
pages-to their respective positions. In the process the two opinions
skirmished over obscure historical precedents and the meaning of a
decades-old student note, 165 all to decide a rather narrow (and
potentially insignificant) question of standing law that had not arisen
before. Both majority and dissent agreed that "as a practical matter" a
denial of standing could have been easily overcome, perhaps with
payment of nominal reward for a successful suit. 166 If, as the majority
claimed, standing could be assured with payment of "only a dollar or

160 Under the arrangements at issue the aggregators would receive a set fee for pursuing the
claims, and reassign any successful claims back to the payphone operators. ld. at 2534.
161 !d. at 2542.
162 /d. at 2544.
163 !d. at 2549 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
164 !d. at 2550.
165
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. REs.
L. REV. 1023, at 1039-1041 (2009). The student note at issue was Comment, The Real Party in
Interest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing Defendant's Interest in the Determination of Proper
Parties Plaintiff, 55 CAL. L.REv. 1452 (1967). See Sprint Cornmc'ns, 128 S.Ct. at 2540
(majority opinion) (discussing note); id. at 2556 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (same).
166 Sprint Commc'ns, 128 S. Ct. at 2544 (majority opinion); id. at 2553 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
·
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two," 167 the dissent was willing to assert "Article Ill is worth a
dollar." 168
In retrospect, the case may have been about even less than the
Justices surmised. While the majority may have thought it was
making it easier to vindicate assigned rights and adopt a lower-cost
means of pursuing dial-around compensation claims, it now appears
the holding may have been completely unnecessary·. Back in the
lower courts, the arrangement suddenly be.came moot. In subsequent
proceedings before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
APCC claimed a sufficient interest in its assigned claims to satisfy the
dissenters' standing requirements, despite its prior protestations to the
contrary. 169 After the Supreme Court's decision in Sprint
Communications, APCC revealed that "in fact it does keep some,
perhaps a substantial portion, of funds awarded for payphone
compensation," despite its prior claims to the contrary. 170 Had this
been APCC' s position from the start, there would have been no
question of its standing, and years of litigation could have been
avoided. Thus, Sprint Communications may turn out to be a
completely inconsequential case-at least for the specific dispute at
issue. If the decision has any effect, however, it will be to lower the
hurdles faced by litigants asserting Article Ill standing, even if only
on the margin.
CONCLUSION
Any attempt to reach a definitive judgment about the Robe1ts
Court at this early date is a perilous exercise. The Roberts Court is
still a work in progress-a work that is likely to see significant
change in the years ahead, with or without a change in the Court's
composition. In an effort to forecast such changes, commentators and
academics rush to identify the Court's early inclinations and foretell
the likely road ahead. The temptation to offer tentative conclusions
can be irresistible-a temptation to which this author and the other
participants to this Symposium have succumbed.
Many commentators assert that the Roberts Court limited citizen
access to federal courts in its frrst four terms. In some areas this may
be true. In the case of Article Ill standing, however, it is not. Given
Chief Justice Roberts's prior writing, and demonstrated interest in
167
16B
169

Id. at 2544 (majority opiruon).
Id. at 2553 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See NetworkiP, LLC v. Fed. Comrnc'ns Comrn'n, 548 F.3d 116, 120 n.2 (D.C. Cir.

2008).
170
Id.; see also id. at 129 (Sentelle, J., concurring) (expressing "dismay" at APCC's
"bizarre conduct" and "sudden reversal" in position).
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standing, one may expect federal jurisdiction to contract. Yet, as this
Article has sought to show, if there has been any change in standing
law on Chief Justice Roberts's watch, it has been in the
opposite direction. If anything, the Roberts Court has expanded the
realm of justiciable claims under Article III, the Chief Justice's
opposition notwithstanding. In this respect, at least, the Roberts Court
has increased access to the federal courts.

